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Impact: How Law Affects Behavior, by 
Lawrence M. Friedman1
ARI ZUCKERBROT2
H.L.A. HART OPENS HIS SEMINAL WORK The Concept of Law with the observation 
that “[f ]ew questions concerning human society have been asked with such 
persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and 
even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’”3 Many of these serious 
thinkers have sought to determine what law is by answering the question: “Where 
does law come from?” Aristotle’s view of natural law holds that law originates in 
its connection to an eternal concept of supreme justice.4 John Austin, on the 
other hand, sought to distinguish the law from other types of coercive force by 
appealing to its origin in some sort of sovereign authority.5 More recently, law and 
society scholars have been similarly preoccupied with understanding the origins 
of law. The focus of their pursuit has been to establish an empirically informed 
understanding of the degree to which governmental structures and social forces 
outside the legal system, such as lobbying and social justice movements, influence 
the creation of laws and legal norms.6
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2016).
2. JD/MBA Candidate (2019), Osgoode Hall Law School and the Schulich School of Business, 
Toronto, Canada.
3. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 1.
4. For a discussion of Aristotle’s views, see e.g. Tony Burns, “Aristotle and Natural Law” (1998) 
19:2 Hist Pol Thought 142.
5. Hart, supra note 3 at 20. 
6. Friedman discusses his own career and the work of his peers. Friedman, supra note 1 at 1. 
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Despite centuries of thought devoted to the origin of the law and how new 
laws arise, there has been little exploration of how laws, once created, influence 
our actions. In Impact: How Law Affects Behavior, Lawrence M. Friedman seeks 
to address that imbalance by asking the question: “Once you have a law, rule 
doctrine, or legal institution, what happens then?”7 Friedman explores this 
question of “impact,” and examines “behavior tied causally, in some way or other, 
to some particular law, rule, doctrine, or institution.”8
Of course, we know a great deal about what Friedman calls legal impact—the 
impact of one law on the development of other laws within a legal system. The 
impact of past judicial decisions on the development of the common law, after 
all, is “what law students study in law school.”9 Law students, however, are not 
routinely examined on the impact of laws outside of the legal system. In the world 
of law and society scholarship, academics have certainly tried to bridge this gap 
between the study of “formal law” and “law in action.”10 Despite their efforts, 
research in this field tends to be confined to examining one particular instance 
of behavioural impact. Does capital punishment deter? Does legalization of 
recreational marijuana mean more people will drive under its influence? In Impact, 
Friedman goes where none of these thinkers have gone before: He pursues an 
understanding of the nature of impact, itself. What are the different ways that 
individuals and groups respond to laws? What determines their behaviour? What 
impacts “impact”?
Perhaps these questions had been avoided for so long because, until very 
recently, they were impossible to answer—there simply was not enough evidence 
to identify trends across different fields of law and different legal systems. 
Friedman, in fact, first attempted to broach the topic in two chapters of a book 
he wrote in 1975.11 Today, however, the “sheer volume”12 of disparate research 
in fields such as economics, criminology, psychology, sociology, political science, 
and anthropology is immense. By drawing on that forty-plus years of social 
science research, Friedman returns to bring about a “more contemporary, more 
comprehensive treatment of the subject.”13 He builds a “conceptual framework”14 
7. Ibid at 2. 
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid at 60.
10. Ibid at 2. 
11. Ibid at ix. Friedman is referencing his earlier work, The Legal System: A Social Science 
Perspective (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975). 
12. Friedman, supra note 1 at 250.
13. Ibid at ix. 
14. Ibid at x.
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around impact: How are laws received and by whom? What are the types of 
behavioural responses to laws? What are the motives behind these responses? The 
result of Friedman’s effort is far more than mere categorization: He has created 
the blueprint for a subdiscipline of its own. 
     Friedman’s framework begins with a discussion of the first link in the 
causal chain of impact: The message of the law must be communicated to an 
audience before any sort of behavioural response can occur.15 Laws often have 
multiple messages and are directed towards multiple audiences. On one level, 
laws communicate a message to the general public, yet the same law can also 
direct a message to a specific group. For example, taxi drivers will likely know 
many of the details governing taxi licensing requirements, while a passenger or a 
member of the general public may not be aware that such regulation even exists.16
A law may also convey a separate message to the legal authorities and broader 
enforcement community whose role is to support the implementation of the law. 
As Friedman explains:
Making burglary a crime, for example, implies, obviously, a complicated message 
to police officers, prosecutors, judges, and perhaps also to juries, prison guards, 
wardens, and the like. Not to mention manufacturers of locks, bolts, and alarm 
systems, and it may be a factor, too, in peoples’ decisions to keep at home a large, 
loud dog with big teeth instead of a kitten or a pet turtle.17
The messages that laws communicate to the world may not necessarily align 
with the intended message or “purpose” of the law. That is, in part, because they 
are recorded in inaccessible legal records like the Income Tax Act,18 which even 
experts have difficulty deciphering. Their meaning warps as they are condensed 
into “directives, guides, manuals, brochures,” or communicated indirectly through 
extra-governmental sources including schoolmates, friends, family, the media, 
or “information brokers,” such as lawyers and accountants.19
Friedman cites a broad range of evidence to suggest that, when the message 
of a law is vague or complicated, it is “converted by the audience, either 
deliberately or unconsciously, into something more concrete, something easier 
to use.”20 He gives the example of speed limits in Rhode Island. In that state, 
as in most parts of the world, speed limits are posted on highway signs. To the 
15. Ibid at 4. 
16. Ibid at 15-16.
17. Ibid at 7.
18. RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp). 
19. Ibid at 7, 32. 
20. Ibid at 29.
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public, these speed limits are the law. But the Rhode Island statutory provision 
against speeding is actually more complex. It states: “No person shall drive a 
vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.”21 Going at a 
speed greater than the speed ‘limit,’ then, is only a prima facie indication that the 
driver was driving at an unreasonable or imprudent speed. To the jurist, the speed 
limit is a complicated standard of reasonableness and prudence. This message is 
further complicated by lived reality—drivers, subject to the law, and the police, 
enforcing the law, commonly understand that if someone drives slightly over the 
limit, they will not get a ticket. So, the message to the public is ultimately that 
the speed limit is “only an approximation.”22 It is by recognizing these layers of 
messages communicated through a law that we can we properly understand the 
behaviours that arise in response to it. 
Friedman also proposes a typology of impact—classifications for the sorts 
of behavioural responses a law may evoke. He explains that any given law can 
lead to a variety of direct and indirect behaviours in a potentially infinite chain 
of causation. “People can respond to laws, rules, and orders. They can obey, they 
can disobey, they can ignore, they can evade. ... [W]e can talk in terms of use, 
nonuse, or misuse; also of avoidance, evasion, coping.”23 
The impact of laws can also be constitutive:
It plays a role in the social construction of reality; it affects the way we think (and 
behave) by helping frame notions of basic facts and institutions: such institutions 
as marriage and divorce, employer and employee, what it means to ‘own’ something 
… . It is a factor in making people accept the world as it is. … Unthinking behavior, 
then, would be part of the ripple effects of law.24
The last branch of Friedman’s framework explores the motivations behind 
different behavioural responses to law. He divides these motivations into three 
categories: punishment and rewards, peer pressure, and psychological factors. 
They can work together and reinforce each other, or they can exist in conflict, 
dampening each other’s influence on a law’s impact.25 
Punishments include fines, custodial sentences, the death penalty, 
banishment, deportation, or loss of privileges (forfeiting a driver’s license, for 
21. RI Gen L § 31-14-1 (2013). For an explanation of this provision, see Friedman, 
supra note 1 at 30. 
22. Friedman, supra note 1 at 31.
23. Ibid at 96.  
24. Ibid at 217.
25. Ibid at 219-20. 
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example).26 Rewards and incentives can include payouts to individuals by the 
state to encourage compliance or to channel behaviour in a certain direction (e.g. 
whistleblower rewards). They can also include allowances for people to legally 
withhold money that would otherwise go to the state (e.g. tax credits).27 
The distinction between reward and punishment is not always clear. The 
same law phrased one way may seem punitive and phrased another way may seem 
to offer a reward.28 For example, a law may say: ‘Everyone must register by x date 
or be fined $10.’ The same law can also be phrased as: ‘Those who register prior to 
x date can retain $10.’ Yet Friedman acknowledges that reward and punishment 
alone would not explain behaviour where “people comply with the law even 
when they do not expect to be caught and punished [or rewarded].”29 Friedman 
identifies peer pressure and psychological motivations as being responsible for 
most law-abiding behaviour, especially when compliance is the norm and the risk 
of rewards or punishment are very low.
Recent research on peer pressure has demonstrated that “behavior can be 
influenced simply by an awareness of what other people do or don’t do, think 
or don’t think.”30 For example, an experiment tried to encourage hotel guests to 
reuse their towels by placing a sign outside their room. One group was shown a 
sign that read, “show… respect for nature” by reusing your towels. For a second 
group of visitors, the sign read: “Join your fellow guests in helping to save the 
environment.” In the third, and most successful condition, the sign asked guests 
to “join the efforts of those who had stayed in that very room.”31 In another 
experiment, psychologist Johannes Feest watched drivers in Northern California 
approach a stop sign. Drivers who had a passenger in the car were more likely to 
make a complete stop at the stop sign than drivers who were alone.32 These results 
were replicated in the context of jaywalkers in New York City. In that study, the 
researchers found that people were more likely to break the law and jaywalk if 
others around them were doing the same.33 
Friedman’s discussion of peer pressure seems especially prescient today in 
the context of the #MeToo movement and issues surrounding the use of the 
press and public pressure as a means to invoke change when the legal system 
26. Ibid at 102.
27. Ibid at 139-40.
28. Ibid at 145.
29. Ibid at 153.
30. Ibid at 182. 
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at 154.
33. Ibid.
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has failed to do so adequately.34 Friedman describes the use of stigma and shame 
as a method to channel behaviour towards a socially desirable end. He argues 
that it is most effective when there is a moral, normative, or religious consensus 
of what constitutes appropriate behaviour. That is why, he believes, it was 
especially common in colonial New England where “punishment was always a 
public affair.”35 However, Friedman argues that, today, “[i]n theory, stigma and 
shame should not work well in complex modern societies, where there is less 
consensus about norms and where it is easy to escape from the heavy weight 
of peer group opinion.”36 Yet, #MeToo has demonstrated that there can be a 
powerful normative consensus in modern society and that technology can spread 
this peer group opinion instantly around the world. It is clearer today than when 
Friedman published his work that advances in technology, such as social media, 
are transforming us into even more of a ‘global village.’ 
Friedman also notes that our behavioural responses to law are not 
only influenced by our perception of judgment by our peers, but also by 
psychological factors that include a “grab bag of various inner attitudes and 
moral issues, including what we often call conscience.”37 These represent our 
own internal convictions that we should adhere to the law because of a moral 
position,38 religiosity, superstition, tradition,39 or a belief in the legitimacy of the 
law-making authority.40
Throughout Impact, Friedman does not hesitate to point out the inherent 
limitations in his endeavour. Namely, the forces that influence behavioural 
responses are so fluid and context-dependent that it is impossible to create 
general rules or predict how people will respond to any given piece of law. Causal 
forces are too complex to be able to ever accurately predict the types or intensity 
of impact that may emerge. Any attempt to do so, Friedman admits, would be at 
“some very high and perhaps useless level of abstraction.”41 “Impact,” as Friedman 
says, “is a slippery, wriggly beast.”42
34. See e.g. Catherine A MacKinnon, “#MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not,” The 
New York Times (4 February 2018), online:  <www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/
metoo-law-legal-system.html>. 
35. Friedman, supra note 1 at 160.
36. Ibid at 160-61.
37. Ibid at 188.
38. Ibid at 205. 
39. Ibid at 206.
40. Ibid at 188-89.
41. Ibid at 3.
42. Ibid at 68.
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What, then, is the value of this conceptual framework? What will be the 
impact of Impact? In Friedman’s view, as well as my own, it is perfectly fine that 
his framework may never reveal predictive rules or ‘laws about laws.’ By merely 
identifying the types of behavioural responses to laws and the motives behind 
those responses, Friedman challenges assumptions behind a formalistic approach 
to law-making that accepts a law’s purpose as its result and ignores the reality 
that laws often create unintended impacts on behaviour. If lawmakers are aware 
of these dynamics, that awareness alone may be a tool with which they can 
draft more effective laws. This framework is also a valuable tool to understand 
social forces outside the law that elicit a range of responses that are similar to 
behavioural responses to the law. Perhaps we can better understand the impact of 
#MeToo, and movements that follow it, by comparing the behavioural responses 
they generate to how people respond to the law.
Conversely, by identifying what is different between the impact of social 
movements and the impact of the law, we can reveal what makes the law 
distinct from other social forces. In doing so, we can arrive at novel insights 
into the nature of law itself. Through Impact, then, Friedman reaffirms his place 
alongside Aristotle, Austin, Hart, and the many other serious thinkers engaged 
in this pursuit.
